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RECENT DECISION
DENIAL OF LOSS OF CONSORTIUM TO WIFE AS VIOLATION
OF FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT RIGHT OF EQUAL
PROTECTION
The plaintiff's husband was injured in an explosion while in the
defendants' building. In a federal diversity action, the plaintiff sought
compensatory and exemplary damages for loss of her husband's "society,,
services, companionship, and consortium." The district court held that
under Indiana law a wife cannot recover for loss of consortium of her
negligently injured husband and granted the defendants' motion to
dismiss. Before the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit the plaintiff
argued that the Indiana rule violates the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment because it denies a wife a cause of action in a situa-
tion where a husband possesses one. The court of appeals affirmed the
judgment, adhering to prior Indiana decisions and expressly rejecting the
constitutional argument. The classification based upon sex was deemed
justifiable, since double recovery could result if a wife received compensa-
tion for loss of services and her husband recovered for lost earnings. A
dissenting opinion decried the patent discrimination inherent in the
judicially conceived notion that a husband may maintain a cause of action
for loss of his wife's services but a wife has no comparable action for loss
of her husband's services due her as a result of coverture. After examining
the historical basis for the discrimination and its anachronistic presence'
in modern society, the dissenting judge concluded that the majority'sf
decision denied the plaintiff equal protection of the law. Miskunas v.
Union Carbide Corporation, 399 F.2d 847 (7th Cir. 1968).
Until recently, the controversy over whether a wife should be allowed
to bring an action for loss of consortium due to a negligently inflicted
injury to her husband had been almost untouched by specific reference
to constitutional questions. The Court of Appeals of the District of
Columbia in the leading case of Hitaffer v. Argonne Co.' and other
1. 183 F.2d 811 (D.C. Cir. 1950). In Hitaffer the court of appeals held that a
wife had a cause of action for loss of consortium due to a negligent injury to her
husband. Until this ruling, wives had been universally denied the right to recover when
injuries to their husbands were occasioned by negligence. Hitaffer was overruled by 'the
same court only as to the remedy under section 5 of the Longshoremen and Harbor
Workers Act, 33 U.S.C. § 905 (1964). See Smither & Co. v. Coles, 242 F.2d 220 (D.C.
Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 354 U.S. 914 (1957).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
courts which adopted its reasoning2 successfully overcame arguments
disfavoring recovery without placing primary reliance on constitutional
language.' Instead, courts resorted to point-by-point rebuttals which
"pierced the thin veils of reasoning" 4 which had separated a wife from
a cause of action for loss of consortium due to a negligent injury to her
husband. Recognition was accorded the fact that a wife's cause of action
2. Cases which follow Hitaffer include: Luther v. Maple, 250 F.2d 916 (8th Cir.
1958); Duffy v. Lipsman-Fulkerson & Co., 200 F. Supp. 71 (D. Mont. 1961); Cooney
v. Moomaw, 109 F. Supp. 448 (D.C. Neb. 1953); Missouri Pac. Transp. Co. v. Miller,
227 Ark. 351, 299 S.W.2d 41 (1957); Yonner v. Adams, 53 Del. 229, 167 A.2d 717
(1961); Bailey v. Wilson, 100 Ga. App. 405, 111 S.E.2d 106 (1959) ; Gordy v. Powell,
95 Ga. App. 822, 99 S.E.2d 313 (1957); Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee Coaches, Inc.,
88 Ga. App. 519, 77 S.E.2d 24 (1953) ; Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881
(1960) ; Acuff v. Schmit, 248 Iowa 272, 78 N.W.2d 480 (1956) ; Montgomery v. Stephan,
359 Mich. 33, 101 N.W.2d 227 (1960); Shepherd v. Consumers Co-op. Ass'n., 384
S.W.2d 635 (Mo. 1964); Novak v. Kansas City Transit, Inc., 365 S.W.2d 539 (Mo.
1963); Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 239 N.E.2d 897, 293
N.Y.S.2d 305 (1968); Hayes v. Swenson, 14 Pa. D. & C.2d 708 (1958); Hoekstra v.
Helgeland, 78 S.D. 82, 98 N.W.2d 669 (1959); Moran v. Quality Alum. Casting Co.,
34 Wis. 2d 542, 150 N.W.2d 137 (1967).
Cases which reject Hitaffer include: Copeland v. Smith Dairy Prod. Co., 288
F. Supp. 904 (N.D. Ohio 1968) ; Jeune v. Del E. Webb Constr. Co., 77 Ariz. 226, 269
P.2d 723 (1954); Deshotel v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 50 Cal. 2d 664, 328 P.2d 449
(1958); Franzen v. Zimmerman, 127 Cola. 381, 256 P.2d 897 (1953); Ripley v. Ewell,
61 So. 2d 420 (Fla. 1952); Baird v. Cincinnati, N.O. & T.R.R., 368 S.W.2d 172
(Ky. 1963); LaEace v. Cincinnati, N. & C. Ry., 249 S.W.2d 534 (Ky. 1952); Coastal
Tank Lines v. Canoles, 207 Md. 37, 113 A.2d 82 (1955); LaRocca v. American Chain &
Cable Co., 23 N.J. Super. 195, 92 A.2d 811 (1952) ; Kronenbitter v. Washburn Wire Co.,
4 N.Y.2d 524, 151 N.E.2d 898, 176 N.Y.S.2d 354 (1958) ; Nelson v. A.M. Lockett & Co.,
206 Okl. 334, 243 P.2d 719 (1952); Brown v. Glenside Lumber & Coal Co., 429 Pa.
601, 240 A.2d 822 (1968); Garrett v. Reno Oil Co., 271 S.W. 764 (Tex. Civ. App.
1954); Ash v. S.S. Mullen, Inc., 43 Wash. 2d 345, 261 P.2d 118 (1953); Nickel v.
Hardware Mutual Cas. Co., 269 Wis. 647, 70 N.W.2d 205 (1955).
Cases which permit a wife to bring a cause of action on the basis of equal protection
include: Karczewski v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., 274 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. Ill. 1967); Owen
v. Illinois Baking Co., 260 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. Mich. 1966); Duffy v. Lipsman-
Fulkerson & Co., 200 F. Supp. 71 (D. Mont. 1961); Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406,
170 N.E.2d 881 (1960); Deems v. Western Maryland Ry., 247 Md. 95, 231 A.2d 514
(1967); Leffler v. Wiley, 15 Ohio App. 2d 67, 239 N.E.2d 235 (1968); Umpleby v.
Dorsey, 39 Ohio Op. 2d 450, 227 N.E.2d 274 (1967); Clem v. Brown, 32 Ohio Op. 2d
477, 207 N.E.2d 398 (1965).
Cases which deny recovery and reject the equal protection argument include:
Lunow v. Fairchance Lumber Co., 389 F.2d 212 (10th Cir. 1968) ; Krohn v. Richardson-
Merrell, Inc., 219 Tenn. 37, 406 S.W.2d 166 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 970 (1967);
Seagraves v. Legg, 147 W. Va. 331, 127 S.E.2d 605 (1967).
3. A stock supply of defenses reappear in consortium cases, some more persuasive
than others. Among the less compelling is the assertion that the wife had no right to
recover at common law and the lifting of the disabilities of coverture created no new
rights. Opponents also argue that courts must await legislative action, the wife's action
is too remote to warrant protection, and the wife is owed no services by the husband.
The fear of double recovery due to an overlap in a husband's action for decreased
ability to support and a wife's action for loss of services is resounded in Miskunas.
The foregoing arguments may be found in their classic form in Dini v. Naiditch, 20
Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960) and Deems v. Western Maryland Ry., 247 Md. 95,
231 A.2d 514 (1967).
4. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 813 (D.C. Cir. 1950).
LOSS OF CONSORTIUM
for loss of consortium is no more remote than a husband's, that con-
sortium involves not only a loss of services but also intangibles which
are not subjects of double recovery, and that schemes are available to
prevent any overlap in damages.5 Furthermore, a wife was given a
separate legal existence when her disabilities under the common law were
removed; the courts averred that with these new legal interests came the
right to have them protected. Finally, the courts were unwilling to
abolish the husband's action for loss of consortium in order to prevent
possible double recovery and inequality. To completely discard the remedy
would be to use a sledge-hammer approach, since the law has long
recognized loss of consortium as a compensable wrong.6
INDIANA AND THE MODERN TREND
In Indiana, a husband has the right to bring an action for loss of
consortium due to a negligent or intentional injury to his wife,7 but
a wife may bring an action only if her husband is injured because of a
third party's intentional act.8 The recent trend outside of Indiana has
been to permit wives to bring an action for loss of consortium resulting
from negligence.'
Consortium includes services, society, sexual intercourse, and con-
jugal affection of the spouse. Generally, the invasion of the consortium
interest involves two elements, pecuniary loss and injury to intangibles ;"o
however, in Indiana, pecuniary loss is not an indispensable element in
recovery."
Although the majority in Miskunas discounted the plaintiff's con-
tention that the Indiana rule violated the equal protection clause of the
fourteenth amendment, the dissenting opinion of Judge Schnackenburg
and two district court opinions applying Indiana law indicate that the
constitutional argument may be both a compelling and winning one for
a wife. In Owen v. Illinois Baking Co.'2 the plaintiff was awarded 5,000
dollars by a federal district court in Michigan for her loss of the con-
sortium of her husband who had been injured in an accident in Indiana
caused by the defendant's negligence. Sitting in a diversity action the
5. See notes 70 and 71 infra.
6. For a history of consortium, see Comment, A Consideration of the Problems in
Consortium Recovery, 30 IND. L. J. 276, 277 (1955).
7. Burk v. Anderson, 232 Ind. 77, 109 N.E.2d 407 (1952).
8. Boden v. Del-Mar Garage, 205 Ind. 59, 185 N.E. 860 (1933).
9. See Brown v. Glenside Lumber & Coal Co., 429 Pa. 601, 240 A.2d 822 (1968)
wherein the court alludes to the "clear trend." See Recent Developments, 13 Vnim. L.
REv. 418, 419 n.13 (1968). For a list of cases which accept and reject Hitaffer, see note
2 supra.
10. Comment, supra note 6, at 277.
11. E.g., Adams v. Main, 3 Ind. App. 232, 235, 29 N.E. 792, 793 (1892).
12. 260 F. Supp. 820 (W.D. Mich. 1966).
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court permitted the wife to recover despite Indiana law, on the ground
that to deny recovery would be to deny her equal protection under the
fourteenth amendment.
A larger verdict was recovered by a wife in Karcgewski v. Baltimore
& O.R.R." for her loss of the consortium of her husband as a result of
an automobile and train collision occurring in Indiana caused by the
defendant's negligence. The Illinois district court found no sufficient
reason to support the difference in treatment accorded husband and wife
in Indiana on the consortium issue.'4 Other recent decisions have also
utilized the equal protection argument to the wife's advantage.' 5
Furthermore, some courts have spoken broadly in terms of giving
the wife the "same" right as the husband, without specific reference to
the equal protection clause. 6 Although the fourteenth amendment is not
specifically mentioned, the language used by these courts to extend a
cause of action to the wife embodies equal protection concepts 7 and
bolsters the constitutional argument. Representative is Montgomery v.
Stephan:
The gist of the matter is that in today's society the wife's
position is analogous to that of a partner, neither kitchen
slattern nor upstairs maid .... Legally, today the wife stands
13. 274 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. I1. 1967).
14. Id. at 175.
15. Duffy v. Lipsman-Fulkerson & Co., 200 F. Supp. 71 (D. Mont. 1961); Dini v.
Naiditch, 20 Ill. 2d 406, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960) ; Deems v. Western Maryland Ry., 247
Md. 95, 231 A.2d 514 (1967) ; Leffler v. Wiley, 15 Ohio App. 2d 67, 239 N.E.2d 235
(1968); Umpleby v. Dorsey, 39 Ohio Op. 2d 450, 227 N.E.2d 274 (1967); Clem v.
Brown, 32 Ohio Op. 2d 477, 207 N.E.2d 398 (1965). Hitaffer, though an earlier case,
speaks in terms of a husband and wife having "equal rights in the marriage relation
which will receive equal protection of the law." 183 F.2d 811, 816 (D.C. Cir. 1950). Cases
which specifically reject the equal protection argument include: Lunow v. Fairchance
Lumber Co., 389 F.2d 212 (10th Cir. 1968) ; Krohn v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 219
Tenn. 37, 406 S.W.2d 166 (1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 970 (1967) ; Seagraves v. Legg,
147 W.Va. 331, 127 S.E.2d 605 (1967).
16. Moran v. Quality Alum. Casting Co., 34 Wis. 2d 542, 551, 150 N.W.2d 137,
141 (1967) : "Both logic and the interest of justice require that, if a husband is to be
accorded the right to recover for loss of consortium of the wife injured through the
negligent acts of another, a wife also should be accorded the same right where she
sustains a loss of consortium of the husband." Moran was later modified as to procedure
by Fitzgerald v. Meissner & Hicks, Inc., 38 Wis. 2d 571, 157 N.W.2d 595 (1968). See
also Cooney v. Moomaw, 109 F. Supp. 448, 450 (D. Neb. 1953); Yonner v. Adams, 53
Del. 229, 251, 167 A.2d 717, 728 (1961) ; Brown v. Georgia-Tennessee Coaches, Inc., 88
Ga. App. 519, 532-33, 77 S.E.2d 24, 32 (1953) ; Montgomery v. Stephan, 359 Mich. 33,
101 N.W.2d 227 (1960) ; Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 239
N.E.2d 897, 293 N.Y.S.2d 305 (1968).
17. The fourteenth amendment forbids any state to deny equal protection of the
laws to any person within its jurisdiction; its purpose is to insure that everyone stands
before the law on equal terms and enjoys the same rights as others in a like situation.
Frost v. Corporation Comm'n of State of Okla., 278 U.S. 515 (1929). See note 16
.supra for cases where unspecific language was employed but where fourteenth amend-
ment objectives were achieved.
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on a par with her husband. Factually, as we well know, her
position is no less than that of an equal partner. The precedents
of the older cases are not valid precedents. They are violative
of women's statutory rights and constitutional safeguards. 8
In a recent New York case'9 in which a wife was allowed to recover for
loss of consortium resulting from negligence the constitutional question
was raised, but the court did not pass on its merit, reaching its decision
instead on the "basis of policy and fairness."2 Although no reference
was made to the fourteenth amendment, the result achieved and the policy
arguments used suggest that equal protection standards may have a tacit
influence on some courts.
CHANGING ROLES: FROM "SERVANT" TO "PARTNER"
The foundation of the equal protection argument for extending the
action for loss of consortium to the wife is an awareness of the changing
legal relationships between spouses. The majority in Miskunas relied on
Goesaert v. Cleary" in which the Supreme Court sanctioned a classifica-
tion by sex and declared that the Constitution does not require the
legislature to have sociological insight. Nonetheless, it is clear that a
court, in determining whether a classification is discriminatory, is not
confined to past notions of equality but should be aware that what is
considered equal treatment under the fourteenth amendment does
change.2
Comparisons formerly made between wives and chattels and ser-
18. 359 Mich. 33, 48-49, 101 N.W.2d 227, 234-35 (1960).
19. Millington v. Southeastern Elevator Co., 22 N.Y.2d 498, 239 N.E.2d 897, 293
N.Y.S.2d 305 (1968).
20. Id.
21. 335 U.S. 464, 466 (1948). Goesaert dealt with a statute enacted by the Michigan
legislature prohibiting women from bartending. The Court upheld the constitutionality
of the statute and recognized the moral and social purposes behind it. As the dissent
points out in Miskunas, the problem of consortium was not created by a statute barring
a wife from recovery; nor does it deal with the problems of employment. In any event, it
is questionable whether discrimination in employment is justifiable; sweeping generaliza-
tions on the weaker sex are probably more chivalrous than rational in the modern
context. See notes 58 and 64 infra.
22. Cf. Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966). The Supreme
Court struck down a state poll tax, declaring it a violation of the equal protection clause
since it made affluence a voting standard. Previously, in Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S.
277 (1937), the Court sanctioned the poll tax as a prerequisite for voting, reflecting
older arguments that such a tax promoted civic responsibility and induced a more
highly selective voting populace. By 1966, these arguments gave way to an equalitarian
outlook; the Court stated at 669:
Likewise, the Equal Protection Clause is not shackled to the political theory
of a particular era. In determining what lines are unconstitutionally discrimina-
tory, we have never been confined to historic notions of equality, any more
than we have restricted due process to a fixed catalogue of what was at a
given time deemed to be the limits of fundamental rights.
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
vants indicate that at common law, the wife found her social and legal
position bluntly inferior."3 A married woman was without the legal
capacity to bring an action on her own. She had no right to sue for the
loss of her husband's consortium since she was not entitled to any
services from him. The husband alone possessed any cause of action for
interference with the marital relation. Behind this allocation of rights was
the fiction of the legal unity of husband and wife, her legal existence
having been merged into his upon marriage.24 Women's Emancipation
Acts removed the disability to sue,25 and the fiction of merged identity
was eroded to the extent that a wife was allowed to bring an action
for loss of consortium due to intentional interference with the marriage
relationship.26
The fiction that a woman loses her individual identity upon marriage
has been dispelled by the partnership view of marriage. A Presidential
Commission has noted that "marriage as a partnership in which each
spouse makes a different but equally important contribution is increasingly
recognized as a reality in this country and is already reflected in the laws
of some other countries."2 Sweden, for example, has been credited with
initiating a marriage code which provides for equal roles and mutual
responsibilities in the marital relationship.2" In 1920, the Swedish male's
guardianship over his wife was revoked, both partners assuming financial
obligations to support each other and their children. 9 Despite opposition
by traditionalists who foresee neuterdom as the ultimate result of political
and social equality of the sexes, Swedish legislators have recently enacted
a law which permits husbands, as well as wives, to obtain leaves of
absence from some types of employment in order to stay at home with
the children. In addition, a woman may keep her maiden name when she
marries, or a husband may in certain cases assume his wife's name."0
23. "The inferior hath no kind of property in the company, care, or assistance of
tho superior ... and therefore the inferior can suffer no loss or injury." 3 W. BLACK-
STONE, COMMENTARIES 143 (2d Amer. Ed. 1799).
24. The legal fiction of single identity of husband and wife follows the religious
conception of one flesh in marriage. Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30
COLUM. L. REv. 651, 670 (1930). Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium,
22 MICH. L. REv. 1, 2 (1923).
25. Indiana enacted its Married Women's Act on March 25, 1879: "A married
woman may bring and maintain an action in her own name against any person or body
corporate for damages for any injury to her person or character the same as if she were
sole...." Ch. 67, § 6 [1879] Ind. Laws 160-61. IND. ANN. STAT. § 38-115 (Burns 1949
Repl.).
26. Holmes v. Holmes, 133 Ind. 386, 32 N.E. 932 (1893) (alienation of affection);
Haynes v. Nowlin, 129 Ind. 581, 29 N.E. 389 (1891) (enticement).
27. THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN
AND OTH3ER PUBLICATIONS OF THE COMMISSION, AMERICAN WOMEN 69 (1965).




The goals of radical Swedish thinkers include steps toward complete
equality and a breakdown of the concept of the patriarchal family unit:
raising boys and girls in the same way, supervising children collectively,
reorganizing housework, shortening working hours to allow parents to
share equally in housework and employment, and abolishing the idea of
the male as the provider.3 Sweden may represent an isolated extreme
with respect to marriage roles and concepts of equality, although it does
serve as a model of what a partnership view of marriage could entail.
However, the relevance of allusion to the Swedish experience, the
desirability of which need not be defended herein, lies in its potential for
throwing into bold relief some of the groundless distinctions extant in
American society"-in this instance, inequality of spouses before the
courts.
If consortium is viewed in the light of the partnership theory of
matrimony, the relational interest protected by the action is shared
equally by the spouses. The rights and obligations of both spouses with
respect to conjugal society, comfort, and companionship arising out of
the marriage contract are equal and separate. 2 Two distinct individuals
are affected by the injury of one; the injury is not suffered by an amor-
phous "entity." Loss of affection, sexual relations, and companionship
are suffered by individuals and not by a family unit; the common law
concept of a husband who brings a cause of action to recover for injuries
to the family"3 is inapplicable where there is a real, identifiable injury
to individuals within that unit." That the law affords redress for more
than mere physical harm and that therefore men are compensated for this
31. Id. 8.
32. Duffy v. Lipsman-Fulkerson & Co., 200 F. Supp. 71 (D. Mont. 1961).
33. Green, Protection of the Family Under Tort Law, 10 HASTINGS L.J. 237 (1959).
34. If the injury is viewed as one to the family unit, the husband would be a
representative sent to court to recover for the consequences of any injury to himself and
the family. Green suggests that a jury automatically considers, all of the plaintiff's
family obligations, the ability of the defendant to pay, and values incident to marriage.
Id. Thus, when a husband brings an action to recover for personal injuries inflicted
on him negligently, damages will also cover any of the wife's interests in the relationship.
The solution which Green proposes is to recognize realistically that the jury does
account for a group of interests when a family is involved in order to prevent further
litigation. However, a wife is presently allowed to bring an action for loss of consortium
where her husband has been injured intentionally; the law does not regard the husband
as the family representative but recognizes the wife as the party whose interest has been
injured.
It may be noted that the Court of Appeals of Maryland has extended the right to
bring an action to the wife but has retained the medieval concept of the suspension of the
wife's legal existence. The court recognizes an "inseparable mutuality of ties" which makes
the marriage relation a "factual entity." An injury to this interest is held to have
created a single cause of action in which both spouses must be parties. Maryland thus
achieves the modern result of providing a remedy while maintaining its adherence to
some now less fashionable conceptions. Deems v. Western Maryland Ry., 247 Md. 95,
107, 231 A.2d 514, 521.
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identifiable injury despite the difficulty of expressing such damages in
pecuniary form seems proper, although one might conclude otherwise,35
and, as most courts are finally noting, "[i]f negligent injury to the wife
raises a cause of action in consortium for the husband, equal protection
requires a similar cause of action for the wife for negligent injury to
her husband." 6
EMPHASIS ON EQUALITY
The constitutional argument in consortium actions is even more
compelling when viewed against the background of Supreme Court
rulings in which the utilization of the equal protection concept has
shifted from control over economic legislation to concern with social
policy in areas of civil rights and criminal law. Activism of the Court,
measured on a spectrum with economic policy at one extreme and civil
rights at the opposite, has undergone striking change since the New Deal
era. Prior to the 1930's, the Court generally declined invitations to protect
substantive individual liberties and to interfere with social problems
resulting from discriminatory state laws.3 Instead, the Court pictured
itself as a supervisor of the other branches of the government and as
the protector of the existing economic order of the nation ;38 repeatedly,
the Court substituted its own judgment on economic policy for that of
the state legislatures, arming itself with due process and equal protection
arguments." Since the New Deal, however, the Court has not reviewed
35. For the "handful of cases" which deny an action for loss of consortium
resulting from a negligent injury to both husband and wife, see cases cited in Deems v.
Western Maryland Ry., 247 Md. 95, 114, 231 A.2d 514, 519 (1967).
36. Clem v. Brown, 32 Ohio Op. 2d 477, 480, 207 N.E.2d 398, 402 (1965).
37. The Court's language in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 552 (1896)
illustrates its refusal to curtail racial discrimination: "If one race be inferior to the
other socially, the Constitution of the United States cannot put them upon the same
plane." Prior to Plessy, the Court in Strauder v. "West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880),
extended political equality to Negroes by striking down a state statute which excluded the
race from grand and petit juries. The Court declared that the fourteenth amendment
".... was designed to assure to the colored race the enjoyment of all the civil rights that
under the law are enjoyed by white persons, and to give to that race the protection of
the general government, in that enjoyment, whenever it should be denied by the States."
Id. at 306. Although Strauder could be interpreted as an attempt by the Court to
champion Negro rights, which would undercut its subsequent avowal in Plessy not to
adjudicate social equality, it has been distinguished by some authorities on the grounds
that the Court sought political, rather than social equality. In 1886, in Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886), the Court breathed life into the concept of equal
protection by holding unconstitutional a city ordinance which in operation discriminated
against Chinese. "The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined to the
protection of citizens. . . . These provisions are universal in their application, to all
persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of
color, or of nationality .. " Id. at 369.
38. E.g., Connolly v. Union Sewer Pipe Co., 184 U.S. 540 (1902); Cotting v.
Kansas City Stock Yards, 183 U.S. 79 (1901) ; Gulf, Colo. & S.F. Ry. v. Ellis, 165
U.S. 150 (1897).
39. B. WRIGHT, THE GROWTH oF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 54 (1942).
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state legislative policy in economic areas,4 but has allowed the states to
formulate economic policy without substantial interference; the Court has
invalidated only one statute concerning economic regulation on the basis
of equal protection.4 Those cases in which the Court has declined to
invalidate state action which discriminates against women may be un-
derstood in this context."
Since the New Deal, the Court has shown increasing concern with
the opposite end of the spectrum-individual liberties and civil rights.
The relative premium placed on civil rights may result from the growing
concern with social welfare which the past three decades have witnessed,
and from the Court's confidence in the ability of state legislatures to
understand and manage economic matters without interference. With
this orientation, the Court has assumed an activist role in equalizing the
rights of individuals, particularly with regard to racial discrimination in
housing, education, transportation, voting, public accommodations and
jury duty, 3 using the equal protection clause to invalidate legislation
which arbitrarily distinguishes between whites and blacks. In criminal
procedure, the Court has generally relied on the due process clause,
although the equal protection clause has seen use in some recent cases.44
To cite additional examples, the equal protection clause has been relied
upon to protect aliens from discriminatory state legislation,45 to determine
apportionment for voting purposes,46 and to extend equality to those who
cannot protect their own rights. 7 Viewed as a whole, the areas which
Between 1899 and 1937, 401 decisions held state legislation unconstitutional, as the
Court extended judicial control into areas such as labor legislation, price regulation,
and entry into business.
40. E.g., McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); Railway Express Agency
v. New York, 336 U.S. 106 (1949) ; Tigner v. Texas, 310 U.S. 141 (1940).
41. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957).
42. See the discussion of Goesaert mrpra note 21 and infra note 58. See also
Mengelkoch v. Industrial Welfare Comm'n, 284 F. Supp. 956 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
43. E.g., Gayle v. Browder, 352 U.S. 903 (1956) (segregation on intrastate
buses); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (school desegregation);
Smith v. Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940) (jury duty); Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536
(1927) (white primary).
44. E.g., Swain v. Alabama, 380 U.S. 202 (1965); Douglas v. California, 372
U.S. 353 (1963) ; Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). Griffin held that both the due
process and equal protection clauses require that all indigent defendants be furnished a
transcript, since appellate review in Illinois was available only if a bill of exceptions or
report of the trial proceedings was presented to the appellate court. See also Smith v.
Texas, 311 U.S. 128 (1940), a case involving equal protection and the right to serve on
a jury.
45. E.g., Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948); Oyama v.
California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
46. E.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
47. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966), and Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S.
535 (1942) provide illustrations of the application of equal protection doctrines to the
insane and the criminal. Another example of the extension of equal protection is Levy v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968), where a Louisiana statute which denied to illegitimate
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the Supreme Court has entered represent examples of social inequality
and individual oppression.
Given this trend, a wife's equal protection argument for consortium
recovery is compelling; here too is a situation where individuals are
treated unequally and in discriminatory fashion, and therefore require
judicial protection. Moreover the Supreme Court has recently invoked
the equal protection clause to invalidate a discriminatory denial of a tort
damage remedy. In refusing to countenance abridgment of an illegitimate
offspring's right to bring a wrongful death action for the death of a
parent the Court asserted in Levy v. Louisiana,4 "[w]e have been
extremely sensitive when it comes to basic civil rights [citation omitted]
and have not hesitated to strike down an invidious classification even
though it had history on its side. [citations omitted]. The rights asserted
here involve the intimate familial relationship between a child and his
own mother."49 Viewed against the backdrop of this overriding relational
interest, classification based on legitimacy was seen to be unjustifiably
arbitrary, and the analogy to the consortium cases would scarcely seem
to require belaboring.5"
A lower Ohio court in Umpleby v. Dorsey51 premised its decision
to allow a wife to recover for loss of consortium caused by negligence
on recent Supreme Court cases:
The due process of law which now requires the state court
to free the confessed killer, robber, and rapist, where denied,
cannot permit a state court rule requiring a law-abiding citizen
to lose in a state court because of the sole fact that she is a
woman.
52
children the right to recover for wrongful death of their mother was held to represent
"invidious" discrimination. See also Kellett, The Expansion of Equality, 37 S. CAL.
L. REv. 400 (1964).
48. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
49. Id. at 71.
50. Justices Harlan, Black and Stewart dissented on the ground that the biological
distinction drawn was no less rational than any other means of attempting to measure
"the degree of love or economic dependence that may exist between two persons." 391
U.S. at 80. Such reasoning would actually appear to affirm the propriety of permitting a
wife to maintain a consortium action. For a summary of the majority's discussion of
the classification used see text at note 72 infra. The interested reader will be amused,
if not enlightened by the dissenters' analogy to a state's denial of privileges to a
corporation which has failed to observe the proper formalities of incorporation and by
their citation of the animosity between King Lear and Edmund as evidence of a tradi-
tionally observed hostility which would justify a legal distinction.
51. 39 Ohio Op. 2d 450, 227 N.E.2d 274 (1967).
52. Id. at 452, 227 N.E.2d at 275. However, the district court in Copeland v.
Smith Dairy Prod. Co., 288 F. Supp. 904 (N.D. Ohio 1968) did not follow earlier Ohio
rulings in Clent and Unmpleby which permitted a wife to recover, but instead denied a
cause of action in accordance with Ohio Supreme Court decisions, such as Smith v.
Nicholas Bldg. Co., 93 Ohio St. 101, 112 N.E. 204 (1915). Apparently, the district court
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Although such backlashing is appealing to a wife who raises the con-
stitutional question, an equal protection argument can be built on sounder
reasoning.
In addition, the courts might well be influenced by recent federal
legislation which reflects the modern trend of protecting individual rights
and according equal rights to women. For example, the Fair Labor
Standards Act,13 as amended by the Equal Pay Act of 1963, requires
equal pay for equal work, without discrimination based on sex. The
Civil Rights Act of 1964," as amended, includes sex as well as race,
color, religion, and national origin as proscribed bases of classification
in most matters covered by the Act.
CLASSIFICATION BASED ON SEX
At the matrix of the constitutional argument is a classification
question. The court in Karczewski,55 dealing with the distinction between
the sexes in consortium actions, identified the protected class as all
married persons:
[e] ach has an equal interest in the elements of the marital
relationship which are protected by the action for loss of
consortium. To deny it to wives is a classification without
reason, and is consequently a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."
A closer look at the rationale given for discrimination explodes the long-
revered myth that the wife's interest in the marital relation and her
contribution to that bond somehow do not warrant the same protection
felt that the lower Ohio courts which handed down Clem and Umnpleby did not apply
Ohio law which denies a wife a cause of action for loss of consortium when the injury
has been occasioned by negligence. The ruling in Sinith was recognized as Ohio law, the
district court leaving questions concerning equal protection and consortium recovery
for the Ohio Supreme Court.
53. 77 Stat. 56 (1963), 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1964). See also the U.S. Crvu.
SERv. CosAI'R., FEDERAL PERSONNEL MANUAL ch. 713-6-713-8 (1963) which set a policy
of non-discrimination in federal employment.
54. 78 Stat. 253 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1964).
It may be noted that discrimination on the basis of sex is not prohibited by section
201(a) of the Act which governs public accommodations. DeCrow v. Hotel Syracuse
Corp., 288 F. Supp. 530 (N.D.N.Y. 1968) recently upheld the right of a proprietor to
exclude women from a bar.
The Supreme Court has remanded a case to a lower federal court which charges a
California statute with violating the Federal Civil Rights Act. The statute restricts the
work hours of women but not men, thereby allegedly denying equal opportunities for
overtime. Mengelkoch v. Industrial Welfare Comm'n, 284 F. Supp. 956 (C.D. Cal. 1968).
Indiana enacted a Civil Rights Act in 1961 to prevent discrimination in employment
and otherwise against persons "because of race, religion, color, national origin, or
ancestry," but did not include "sex." IND. ANN. STAT. § 40-2307 (Burns 1965 Repl.).
55. Karczewski v. Baltimore & 0. Ry., 274 F. Supp. 169 (N.D. Ill. 1967).
56. Id. at 179-80.
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as her spouse receives. Within the class of married persons are sub-
classes of husbands and wives; any classification which a legislature or
court makes, such as those who may bring consortium actions and those
who may not, must be reasonable and not arbitrary, and must rest on
some ground of difference which bears a fair relation to the subject."8
In a consortium action where the injury to the plaintiff's spouse was
caused by negligence, the courts have neatly paired recovery with hus-
bands and non-recovery with wives, an arbitrary classification since
there is no reasonable connection between an individual's sex and loss
of consortium. Public policy and individual attitudes loom large in what
is deemed a rational rather than an arbitrary classification. Although
classification according to sex is not unconstitutional per se,59 some
courts have concluded that it has no rational basis in consortium
recovery.6" On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Tennessee8"
57. The assumption that financial support of a family by the husband-father
is a gift from the male sex to the female sex, and, in return, the male is
entitled to preference in the outside world is all too common. Underlying this
assumption is the unwillingness to acknowledge any value for child care and
homemaking because they have not been ascribed a dollar value.
Eastwood and Murray, Jane Crow and The Law: Sex Discrimination and Title VII,
34 GEO. WAsH. L. REv. 232, 241 (1965).
58. A city ordinance prohibiting the employment of women as bartenders was held
to be based on a reasonable classification and therefore was held not a denial of equal
protection in Anderson v. City of St. Paul, 226 Minn. 186, 32 N.W.2d 538 (1948). The
need for a male bartender to promote order on the premises and public policy against
the presence of women in bars were set forth as reasons underlying the classification.
On the other hand, the dissenter found the classification unreasonable, since the
attitude towards women in bars had changed and there was no proof that a female
bartender could not control her customers. The Supreme Court of Idaho in State v.
Burke, 79 Idaho 205, 312 P.2d 806 (1957) held that a statute restricting bartender
licenses to males was not unconstitutional. The dissent, however, attacked the law as
arbitrary and discriminatory, since the legislature could not enact a law prohibiting a
class from engaging in work open to all others because of sex. A similar ordinance was
held unconstitutional in Brown v. Foley, 158 Fla. 734, 29 So. 2d 870 (1947). Also see
note 21 supra for a discussion of Goesaert. The Supreme Court of the United States in
Goesaert was in accord with the foregoing state decisions, upholding the constitutionality
of a similar statute which banned women from the occupation of bartending. In State v.
Hunter, 208 Ore. 282, 300 P.2d 455 (1956), the court upheld the constitutionality of a
statutory ban against female wrestling, based on the promotion of general welfare and
good morals. However, the Supreme Court of New York in Shpritzer v. Lang, 32
Misc. 2d 679, 224 N.Y.S.2d 105 (Sup. Ct. 1962) struck down an administrative code
provision prohibiting a woman policeman from advancing to sergeant as unconstitutional
because the classification was arbitrary. Among the more novel recent developments on
this point is the securing of licenses by female jockeys. Louisville Courier Journal,
Nov. 22, 1968 at 8B.
59. Shpritzer v. Lang, 32 Misc. 2d 693, 224 N.Y.S. 2d 105 (Sup. Ct. 1962).
60. For example, in Umpleby v. Dorsey, 39 Ohio Op. 2d 450, 227 N.E.2d 274
(1967), the Common Pleas Court stated at 451: "This distinction bears no relation to
fact, and today is not even recognized by legal fiction. It is the essence of arbitrary
discrimination and the antithesis of equal protection." See also Karczewski v. Baltimore
& 0. Ry., 274 F. Supp. 169, (N.D. I1. 1967) ; Clem v. Brown, 32 Ohio Op. 2d 477, 207
N.E.2d 398, 401 (1965); Brown v. Glenside Lumber & Coal Co., 429 Pa. 601, 240 A.2d
822 (1968) (dissenting opinion).
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denied a wife recovery because of the "many and obvious" reasons for
the "practical and logical classification,"62 but failed to elaborate.
Equal protection of the law implies that all litigants who are
similarly situated may apply to courts for relief under like conditions,
without discrimination, and with like protection. Sex, like age, race,
and color, is easily identifiable and has been dubbed a "natural" classi-
fication; such differences may lead to instant discrimination, and the
rationale used to single out such a group must be closely scrutinized.
In the face of a changing social attitude toward women, differences in
physical structure, the need to protect health and welfare, and the home-
maker role are no longer sufficient defenses of a classification based
upon sex.
While in the past male-dominated courts and legislatures justified
restrictions on women by viewing special treatment as protective of
motherhood and health,63 modern social phenomena such as the working
mother and family planning have played havoc with traditional notions
of womanhood and propriety. The reversal of judicial attitude toward
the "weaker sex" is ironic; instead of discriminating in order to protect
women from the vicissitudes of a male world, the courts now face-as
the current challenge of maximum working hours for women64 well
illustrates-the task of destroying such "protective" treatment in order
to establish equality between the sexes under the fourteenth amendment.
The court in Miskunas65 theorized that since only 34.4 per cent of
wives are employed (as compared with 87.8 per cent of married men),
the chances for double recovery would be too great in a wife's action for
loss of consortium. Because a wife cannot recover for her own unpaid
services, her husband could recover for loss of household services in his
consortium action without fear of double recovery. Double recovery
might result, however, if a wife were allowed to recover for loss of
her husband's services, since those damages might be duplicated in the
61. Krohn v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 219 Tenn. 37, 406 S.W.2d 166 (1966),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 970 (1967).
62. Id. at 43, 406 S.W.2d at 168.
63. E.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937). Upholding a
state statute which authorized the establishment of minimum wages for women and
minors, the Court characterized its action as "protective" of a state policy which sought
to alleviate the weaker bargaining position of women. An earlier example is Muller
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908), where the Court upheld regulation of working hours
for women. The "Brandeis brief" furnished the Court with data justifying special
treatment for women. Also see note 58 supra.
64. Compulsory shorter working hours for -women may now be a violation of the
1964 Federal Civil Rights Act, 78 Stat. 253 (1964), 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e) (1964). The
Supreme Court has decided not to rule yet on this question, but has sent a case in which
it arises back to the district judge. Mengelkoch v. Industrial Welfare Comm'n, 284
F. Supp. 956 (C.D. Cal. 1968). Compare Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908).
65. 399 F.2d 847, 850 (7th Cir. 1968).
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husband's action for lost earnings.66 On this basis the court concluded:
"In view of the possibility of double recovery if the wife were given a
consortium action, . . . this case involves a permissible classification
rather than an impermissible discrimination."67
The court apparently deemed 34.4 per cent insignificant; but in
fact, this figure reflects a modern change from rural to urban life which
converted unpaid family services into paying jobs outside the home for
a substantial number of married women.6" It is difficult to determine
how much greater than 34.4 per cent the figure must be in order to make
the classification unreasonable. The loss of a wife's services, if she works
outside the home, includes more than the traditional household tasks;
her "services" to the family may in some instances be equal to or
greater than the husband's. If a working husband may bring an action,
a working wife should have the same right, since double recovery is no
more likely in one case than the other. Equal treatment demands either
abolishing the cause of action of both spouses or allowing a wife the same
right of action as her husband. Some courts have exploded the "double
recovery bogey"69 by requiring husband and wife to bring a joint
action,7" or by subtracting any duplication in damages. 1 Furthermore,
in a companion case to Levy v. Louisiana,7 2 the Supreme Court has
refused to uphold denial of a mother's cause of action for the wrongful
death of her out-of-wedlock child despite the argument that availability
of such suits might serve as an inducement to assert motherhood
fraudulently in order to collect damages. The Court's averment that a
burden of proof problem of this nature is preponderated by compelling
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. In 1900, five million women workers comprised eighteen per cent of the labor
force in the United States. In 1965, twenty-four million women worked, making one out
of every three workers a female. Most women who make up this figure are married. In
1962, more than sixty per cent of working women were married, compared with twenty-
five per cent in 1920. In addition, eight out of ten women have paid employment outside
of the home at some time during their lives. THE REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S CoM-
MISSION ON THE STATUS OF WOMEN AND OTHER PUBLICATIONS OF THE COMMoISSION,
AMERICAN WOMEN 20-47, 84 (1965).
69. Dini v. Naiditch, 20 I1. 2d 406, 427, 170 N.E.2d 881, 891 (1960).
70. When the suit of the physically injured spouse is tried with the joint
action for injury to the marital relationship, the jury should be instructed
as to the particular matters for which compensation is to be made to the
physically injured spouse in his or her separate action . . . and the matters to
be considered only in fixing the damages in the joint action.
Deems v. Western Maryland Ry., 247 Md. 95, 114, 231 A.2d 514, 525 (1967).
71. "Any conceivable double recovery, however, can be obviated by deducting from
the computation of damages in the consortium action any compensation given her
husband in his action for the impairment of his ability to support." Dini v. Naiditch,
20 Ill. 2d 406, 427, 170 N.E.2d 881, 891 (1960).
72. Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
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social concern for intimate relational interests"3 would seem quite pertinent
to the double recovery fear in consortium actions.
In addition, the distinction made by some courts between intentional
and negligent injuries is puzzling. Courts which deny the wife an action
for loss of consortium where her husband has been negligently injured
allow the wife's action if the injury was intentional. Since the character
of the injury does not alter the "threat" of double recovery, it is difficult
to perceive how such a distinction alters the underlying classification
issue.
Indiana's Constitution specifically provides that the legislature shall
not grant to any citizen or class privileges which do not belong equally
to all citizens, upon the same terms.74 Although Indiana by statute does
not specifically deny recovery to the wife for loss of consortium where her
husband has been negligently injured, court decisions are to be regarded
as actions of the state and are subject to attack on constitutional
grounds.75 Since Indiana courts have interpreted the Married Women's
Act as not including a cause of action for loss of consortium where a
husband's injury was occasioned by negligence, the State constitution
would seem to be violated if the classification is invalid.
CONCLUSION
A reconsideration of the equal protection argument in consortium
recovery must be made; blind adherence to precedent cannot suffice as
the basis for denying recovery to a wife in a situation in which her
spouse is invited to seek relief. Rather than rejecting the constitutional
question, courts must examine past decisions which upheld the distinction
and, forsaking outdated rationale, extend equal protection under the law
to women in actions for loss of consortium arising out of negligent
injuries to their spouses.
Ann L. McCallister
73. See text at notes 48-50 supra.
74. IND. CoNsT. art. I, § 23.
75. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 17 (1948).
